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Abstract
Tax changes are often announced before the implementations and are not perma-
nent but only temporary. R&D rms will optimally adjust their investment decision
to a tax schedule accordingly. This paper analyzes how anticipated and temporary
tax changes dynamically aect the innovation activities. For the purpose, we con-
sider adjustment costs for the investment process and allow rms to make a forward
looking investment decision in the framework of an R&D-based endogenous growth
model. Calibrating the model with U.S. data, we obtain new insights on how to
design the corporate taxation policy. A dividend tax cut is not an eective policy
instrument irrespective of how it is implemented. On the other hand, a capital gains
tax cut and a rise of the R&D tax credit rate are an eective policy instrument ir-
respective of how they are implemented. However, the implementation lags of these
tax changes worsen the eectiveness of them.
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1 Introduction
Technological progress through commercial R&D activities is a major source of economic
growth. Firms make an R&D investment decision, considering the cost and the benet of
R&D. Those values are aected by dierent taxation policies. As Hall and Van Reenen
(2000) surveys, scal incentives for R&D investments dier across countries and change over
time. The purpose of this paper is to provide the clear policy implications of tax changes
by using an R&D-based endogenous growth model. In our model economy, technological
progress is driven from in-house R&D performed by long-lived value-maximizing rms. The
novel feature of our study is that we consider how rms make a forward-looking investment
decision of in-house R&D in reaction to future or temporary tax changes. In the real world,
tax changes are usually announced before the implementations and are not permanent
but only temporary. In these situations, rms and households have an opportunity to
adjust their intertemporal behavior to a tax schedule. For better understanding of taxation
policy, it is important to consider what dierences of the policy eects of tax changes arise
depending on how the tax changes are implemented.
Calibrating the model with U.S. data, we obtain the following main ndings. First, we
show that an anticipated dividend tax cut stimulates in-house R&D and aggregate growth
during the announcement phase. After the implementation, the tax cut is detrimental to in-
house R&D and aggregate growth. The welfare eect of the tax cut are negative irrespective
of how it is implemented. However, the implementation lags diminish the welfare looses.
It allow rms to adjust the timing of dividend payments to the tax schedule. The future
dividend tax cut increases the future cost of in-house R&D. Hence rms have an incentive to
increase their current in-house R&D investments in order to raise the subsequent dividend
payments. Besides, households can adjust more smoothly to the tax schedule. Second,
we show that an anticipated capital gains tax cut and a rise of the R&D tax credit rate
have a negative impact on in-house R&D and aggregate growth during the announcement
phase. After the implementation, these tax changes stimulate in-house R&D and aggregate
growth. The welfare eect of these tax changes is both positive irrespective of how they are
implemented. However, the implementation lags reduce the welfare gains. Future these tax
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changes reduce the future cost of in-house R&D. Hence rms have an incentive to reduce
their current in-house R&D investments and raises their current dividend payments. The
negative announcement eect on growth exceeds the positive eect derived from more
smooth path of the consumption and the leisure time of households.
To summarize our results, we suggest the following policy implications. A dividend tax
cut is not eective policy instrument irrespective of how it is implemented. On the other
hand, a capital gains tax cut and a rise of the R&D tax credit rate are an eective policy
instrument irrespective of how they are implemented. However, the implementation lags
of these tax changes worsen the eectiveness of them.
Our analyses are based on that of Peretto (2007, 2011). Specically, the model of
Peretto (2007, 2011) considers the economy where long-lived value-maximizing rms con-
tinuously improve the quality of their own product through in-house R&D, while at the
same time new rms also enter into the market. The advantage of the model of Peretto
(2007, 2011) is to eliminate the well-known undesirable scale eect property while keeping
the policy eect property supported by recent growing empirical literatures.1 Increases
in the scale of the aggregate economy are perfectly fragmented by endogenous product
proliferation. In-house R&D investments are only related to an average rm-level scale.
As a result, the channel through the undesirable scale eect is removed. Only the channel
through the nancial market remains, which yields non-negligible eect of scal policy on
the long-run growth.2
However, in the model of Peretto (2007, 2011), rm's investment decision of in-house
1The rst generation R&D-based endogenous growth model (e.g. Romer(1990) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991)) indicates that the equilibrium growth rate is increasing in the labor endowment. However,
Jones (1995a) refutes this property by the time-series data of the post-war period. And then, the following
two prominent types of model are developed. The former type is referred to as the semi-endogenous growth
type (e.g. Jones (1995b) and Segerstrom (1998)). They resolves the undesirable scale eect property by
assuming the diminishing returns in R&D production technologies. This specication yields that the
steady state growth rate is only pinned down to population growth rate. By contrast, the latter type
is referred as the fully-endogenous type (e.g. Peretto (1998), Howitt (1999) and Futagami and Ohkusa
(2003)). They assumes that both of vertical innovation and horizontal innovation occur. This specication
yields that the steady state growth rate is also dependent of the other parameters and policy variables.
Recent growing empirical literatures (e.g. Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and Howitt (2007), and Ang and
Madsen (2011)) report that the latter type performs well rather than the former type.
2There is no consensus about whether the long-run growth responds to taxation policy or not. However,
recent empirical studies (e.g. Romer and Romer (2010) and Mountford and Uhilg (2009)) support that
the macroeconomic eects of tax changes are much higher than the conventional thoughts.
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R&D turns out to be static problem. The reason is that the model assumes that the
production function of in-house R&D is linear. This assumption implies that current in-
house R&D investments are only dependent of the current market condition and tax rates.
As a result, if we consider anticipated and temporary tax changes in the setting, we fail to
capture how rm's investment decision of in-house R&D dynamically reacts to anticipated
and temporary tax changes. To examine the macroeconomic impacts of such tax shocks, we
also incorporate the framework of adjustment costs of investment used in the literatures
of investment theory.3 More specically, we assume that rms confront on the convex
adjustment costs associated with in-house R&D investments. This specication is indeed
more realistic. Some empirical literature points out the existence of high adjustment costs
for R&D investments (e.g. Nadiri (1989), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Brown
and Petersen (2011)). In the presence of the adjustment cost, rm's investment decision
of in-house R&D alters to a forward-looking setting. Therefore, the dynamic system of
the economy is characterized also by the (tax-adjusted) shadow value of in-house R&D,
which determines the level of in-house R&D investments.4 The shadow value summarizes
all informations relevant to the investment decision of in-house R&D. The exibility of
the shadow value is very useful to analyze how the investment decision of in-house R&D
dynamically reacts to anticipated and temporary tax changes.
Peretto (2007, 2011) have already examined eects of various tax changes related to
corporate activities. In particular, Peretto (2007, 2011) mainly focus on eects of a dividend
tax cut like that conducted in the Jobs Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2003 (JGTRRA) in the U.S..5 To be more detail, Peretto (2007) analyzes the revenue-
neutral tax changes in the environment where the rate of the dividend tax is endogenously
determined to nance the tax changes and balance the budget constraint of the government.
The analyses suggest that policy makers should conduct the other taxation policy (such as
3See, for example, Hayashi (1982), Abel (1982), and Abel and Blanchard (1983)
4In Peretto (2007), the dynamic system of the economy is characterized by only one state variable
(the number of rms per capita). In Peretto (2011), it is characterized by one state variable (the number
of rms per capita) and one jump variable (the consumption ratio). On the other hand, the dynamic
system of the model in our analysis is characterized by not only the number of rms per capita and the
consumption ratio but also one additional jump variable (the shadow value of the innovation).
5To be precise, this tax reform substantially reduced the rate of the dividend tax with the moderate
cut of capital gains tax.
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a capital gains tax cut and a rise of the R&D tax credits) rather than a dividend tax cut.
Peretto (2011) extends to the case where the government nances tax changes with debt.
Calibrating the model with U.S. data, Peretto (2011) quantitatively shows that a dividend
tax cut produces the slowdown of aggregate growth and considerable welfare losses.
The dierences between our paper and Peretto (2007, 2011) are as follows. Peretto
(2007, 2011) only focus on the macroeconomic impacts of unanticipated and permanent
tax changes. On the other hand, we consider eects of anticipated and temporary tax
changes in the environment where rms dynamically determine the level of their R&D
investments. Besides, we examine the eectiveness of the alternative policy instruments
rather than that of a divided tax cut in the environment where the government nances the
tax changes with debt just like Peretto (2011). As Peretto (2011) claims, such a nancing
scheme is more appropriate to consider policy experiments of the taxation policy.
Our paper is also related to the following previous studies. Zeng and Zhang (2002) and
Peretto (2003) also study eects of tax changes on the basis of non-scale R&D-based growth
model. However, both of the paper analyze only unanticipated and permanent tax changes
and do not consider transitional dynamics and welfare implications. Summers (1981) and
Abel (1982) analyze how anticipated and temporary tax changes aect a forward-looking
investment decision of rms by using the framework of the adjustment costs for investments.
However, their analysis are based on the partial equilibrium approach. As a result, their
analysis can not consider eects on aggregate growth and welfare. Strulik and Trimborn
(2010) studies eects of anticipated and temporary tax changes in the general equilibrium
setting. Their model is based on the neoclassical growth model with endogenous corporate
nance and then the steady state growth rate is exogenous in this setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the dynamic system and the steady state equilibrium of the market economy.
Section 4 quantitatively analyzes the transitional adjustment of the aggregate economy
to tax changes, calibrating the model with U.S. data. Section 5 conducts the sensitivity
analysis of the numerical analysis. Finally, Section 6 discusses the policy implications and
states the conclusion remarks.
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2 The model
In this section, we set up the model based on Peretto (2011). Except for the presence
of adjustment costs associated with in-house R&D investment for quality improving, the
environment is the same as Peretto (2011). Time is continuous. The economy is closed
and consists of the nal goods sector, the intermediate goods sector, households, and the
government. Long-lived value-maximizing rms produce their specic intermediate good
and continuously improve the quality of their own product through in-house R&D, while
at the same time new rms also enter into the market. All scal variables are treated
parametrically since they change either only at discrete events or not at all. And so we
omit the time index, t, on scal variables.
2.1 The nal goods sector
The nal goods, Yt, is produced by the following production function:
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xit
 
Zit
Z1 t Lit
1 
di; 0 < ;  < 1; (1)
where Nt, Xit, and Lit respectively represent the mass of intermediate goods, the input of
intermediate good i (produced by rm i), and the input of labor who use the intermediate
good i. The productivity of Lit depends not only on the quality of the intermediate good
i, Zit, but also on the average level of quality across intermediate goods, Zt 
R Nt
0
1
Nt
Zjtdj.
Final goods are consumed by households and the government and used only as one factor
of all activities in the intermediate goods sector. Perfect competition prevails in the nal
goods sector. The price of nal goods is normalized to one. Therefore, we obtain the
following optimal conditions:
Xit =


Pit
 1
1   
Zit
Z1 t Lit

; (2)
Lit =

1  
Wt
 1

Xit
 
Zit
Z1 t
 1 
 ; (3)
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where Pit and Wt respectively represent the price of the intermediate good i and the wage
rate of labor.
2.2 The intermediate goods sector
Monopolistic competition prevails in the intermediate goods sector. There is the continuum
of goods indexed by type i 2 [0; Nt]. The rm i exclusively produces its dierentiated good
with its quality Zit. Monopoly of each rm is permanently protected by the perfect patent
protection. Producing one unit of intermediate goods requires one unit of nal goods. And
xed operating costs,  Zt ( > 0), are required at each point in time.
Each rm improves its product quality through in-house R&D. The law of motion of
the rm-specic quality is
_Zit = Rit: (4)
In contrast to Peretto (2007, 2011), we assume that given increases of the rm-specic
quality level, Rit  0, involve adjustment costs associated with the innovation, following
the specication of Hayashi (1982). Specically, we assume that the total amount of R&D
expenditure is given by
(Rit; Zit) = Rit +
h
2
R2it
Zit
; h > 0; (5)
where the case of h = 0 corresponds to the specication of Peretto (2007, 2011).6
The gross cash ow of rm i is Fit = Xit(Pit  1)  Zt, where the rst term represents
revenue minus variable production costs and the second term represents xed operating
costs. Let  be the rate of the R&D tax credit (the fraction of R&D expenditure which
rms are allowed to subtract from their corporate taxable amount).7 The total amount of
corporate tax imposing on rm i is  [Fit   (Rit; Zit)], where  represents the rate of
the corporate tax. The gross cash ow, Fit, distributes as follows:
Fit =  [Fit   (Rit; Zit)] + Eitdit + Jit;
6This functional form is based on Turnovsky (2000).
7Although  is assumed to be zero for simplication in Peretto (2011), we follow the specication of
Peretto (2007) in order to see the eects of the tax credit policy for R&D investment as well.
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where Eit, dit, and Jit respectively represent the number of equities authorized by rm i,
the pre-tax dividends per share of rm i, and retained earnings of rm i. The rst term of
the RHS of the above identity represents the amount of corporate tax, the second terms
represents the amount of dividends delivered to equity shareholders, and the last term
represents retained earnings. Financial constraint of rm i is written by Jit + _Eitvit =
(Rit; Zit), where _Eit and vit respectively represent the number of newly issued equity of
rm i and the market value per share of rm i. Since here we do not consider nancing by
bond issue, the above identity indicates that in-house R&D investment must be nanced
by retaining earnings, newly issued equities, or both.8 Along the lines of Peretto (2011),
we focus on the scenario where the marginal source of in-house R&D is only limited to
retaining earnings. This scenario is called as \New view" in the literature of corporate
nance. In this scenario, (Rit; Zit) = Jit because of _Eit = 0.
Let Vit  Eitvit and Dit  Eitdit. Without loss of generality, Eit is normalized to one.
Dividends of rm i is given by
Dit = (1  )Fit   (1  )(Rit; Zit): (6)
The return on equity is rewritten by
rt = (1  D)Dit
Vit
+ (1  V )
_Vit
Vit
: (7)
where D is the rate of the dividend tax and V is the rate of the capital gains tax.
Integrating (7) forward yields the value of rm i as follows:
Vit =
Z 1
t
exp
Z s
t
  1
1  V rvdv

1  D
1  V

[(1  )Fis   (1  )(Ris; Zis)] ds:
We consider a symmetric equilibrium by assuming that any new rm starts with the
same level of technologies as incumbents so that the subscript i can be dropped. In the
equilibrium, Zt = Zt holds. Each rm maximizes its value, subject to (2) and (4), given Z.
To solve the inter-temporal maximization problem, we dene the following current-value
8See Turnovsky (1990) for the detailed discussion.
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Hamiltonian as
H  1  D
1  V [(1  )Ft   (1  )(Rt; Zi)] + qt [Rt] ;
where the co-state variable, qt, represents a shadow value of in-house R&D. We obtain the
following optimal conditions:
Pt =
1

; (8)
~q  Sqt =

1 + h
Rt
Zt

; (9)
rt =
(1  V )
S
@Ft
@Zt
1
qt
+
(1  V )h
2S

Rt
Zt
2
1
qt
+ (1  V ) _qt
qt
: (10)
where for simplifying notation, we dene
S  (1  V )
(1  D)(1  ) and  
1  
1   :
The transversality condition is lims!1 exp

  1
1 V
R s
t
rvdv

Zsqs = 0. From (9), the rate
of quality growth is given by
z^t 
_Zt
Zt
=
8>><>>:
1
h
(~qt   1) ; if ~qt > 1;
0; if ~qt  1:
(11)
(8) represents the pricing rule with constant mark-up. (9) indicates that rms undertake
in-house R&D investment up to the point where a tax-adjusted shadow value of in-house
R&D (the RHS) is equal to the cost of the innovation (the LHS). Hereafter, ~qt is called as
modied q along the lines of Hayashi (1982). Where there is no adjustment costs (h = 0),
modied q always pins down to one.9 By contrast, in our setting, modied q is endogenously
determined and it has a transitional process in equilibrium. (10) represents the no-arbitrage
condition of return on in-house R&D. (11) shows that the rate of quality growth is the
function of only modied q. Since modied q is derived from the intertemporal optimization
9See Peretto (2007, 2011).
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problem of rms, all informations relevant to in-house R&D decision are summarized by
modied q.
Development of new product requires Zt ( > 1). New entry rms nance by issuing
equity. Free-entry condition yields
Vt = Zt , _Nt > 0: (12)
From (6) and (12), the return on equity, (7), is rewritten by
rt = (1  D)

(1  ) Ft
Zt
  (1  )(Rt; Zt)
Zt

+ (1  V )
_Zt
Zt
: (13)
2.3 Households
The economy has identical households who provide labor supply elastically and purchase
assets. The labor market and the asset market are supposed to be competitive. Each indi-
vidual member of households is identically endowed with one unit of time. The population
exogenously grows over time at the constant rate,  > 0. Without loss of generality, the
number of population at time 0 is normalized to one. Hence, the number of population at
time t is et. The household maximizes the following utility function:
Ut =
Z 1
t
e ( )(s t)

logCse
 s +  log (1  ls)

ds;
where Ct, lt,  > 0, and  (> ) respectively represent the aggregate consumption, the
fraction of the time allocated to work per capita, the measure of preference for leisure, and
the rate of the time preference. The budget constraint of the household is given by
_NtVt = Nt
h
(1  D)Dt   V _Vt
i
+ (1  L)Wtltet   (1 + C)Ct   Tt;
where L, C , and Tt respectively represent the rate of the labor income tax, the rate of the
consumption tax, and the lump-sum tax. Solving the inter-temporal optimization problem
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yields the following optimal conditions:
_Ct
Ct
= rt   + ; (14)
lt = 1  (1 + C)Ct
(1  L)Wtet : (15)
The transversality condition is lims!1 e ( )(s t)ass = 0, where t represents a shadow
value of holdings of assets.
2.4 The government
The government spending is given by Gt = gYt (0 < g < 1). The share of the government
spending to output is assumed to be an exogenously given rate. Along the lines of Peretto
(2007, 2011), it is assumed that the government spending does not aect the utility of
households and the eciency of production activities in order to isolate the eects of
distortionary taxes from the eects of the government expenditure. The budget constraint
of the government is given by
Gt = LWtNtLt + CCt + Nt [Ft   (Zt; Rt)] + DNtDt + VNt _Vt + Tt:
Since the Ricardian equivalence holds, we can see the same equilibrium dynamics as the
economy with public debt.
3 The market equilibrium
3.1 The equilibrium dynamics
In this section, we derive the dynamic system of the market equilibrium. The market
equilibrium condition of nal goods is given by
Yt = Gt + Ct +Nt [Xt + Zt + (Zt; Rt)] + Zt _Nt: (16)
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Dene the number of rms per capita as nt  Nt=et and the ratio of the aggregate
consumption to outputs as ct  Ct=Yt. In Appendix 1, we show that the labor supply per
capita is given by
l(ct) =
1
1 +  ct
;    (1 + C)
(1  L)(1  ) > 0: (17)
The reduced-form aggregate production function of nal goods is given by
Yt = 
l(ct)e
tZt; 
   21  (18)
In Appendix 2, we show the following simultaneous dierential equation constitutes the
dynamical system of the economy (in the case where ~qt > 1):
_nt =

1  2   g   ct
 
l(ct)

 

+
(Sqt)
2   1
2h
+ 

nt

; (19)
_ct = ct [1 +  ct]

rt     Sqt   1
h

; (20)
_qt =
1
1  V rtqt  
(1  )
S

l(ct)
nt
  (Sqt   1)
2
2Sh
; (21)
where from (13), the interest rate is given by
rt =
(1  V )
S
"
(1  )
l(ct)
nt
     (Sqt)
2   1
2h
#
+ (1  V )Sqt   1
h
: (22)
See Appendix 3 for the dynamic system in the case where ~qt  1.
3.2 The steady state equilibrium
Let yt  Yt=ltet, which represents outputs per worker. From (18), the growth rate of
outputs per worker is given by y^t  _yt=yt = z^t = (~qt 1)=h. In what follows, we characterize
the steady state equilibrium, fn; c; ~q; l; r; y^g. From (20), _ct = 0 and c > 0 implies (if
~q > 1)
r = +
~q   1
h
: (23)
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From (21), _qt = 0 and ~q
 > 1 implies
r = (1  V )(1  )


l(c)
n
1
~q
+ (1  V )(~q
   1)2
2h
1
~q
: (24)
This equation represents the no-arbitrage condition of return on in-house R&D in the
steady state equilibrium. It turns out that a dividend tax cut does not directly aect
incentives to in-house R&D. On the other hand, a corporate tax cut, a capital gains tax
cut, and a rise in the rate of the tax credit directly enhances incentives to in-house R&D.
From (23) and (24), eliminating r yields (if ~q > 1)

l(c)
n
=

(1  )

1
1  V

+
~q   1
h

~q   (~q
   1)2
2h

: (25)
Substituting (23) and (25) into (22), we nd that ~q is derived from solving f(~q) = 0 with
respect to ~q where
f(~q) 
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1
1  V
24+ ~q   1
h
35 (S   ~q) + (~q   1)2
2h
+ 
~q2   1
2h
 S
~q   1
h
+


; if ~q > 1;

1  V (S   ~q) +


; if ~q  1:
(26)
If S  1   (1 V )

< 1, f(1) < 0 and f 0(~q) < 0. In the case, there is no steady state
equilibrium with a positive rate of quality growth. If 1  (1 V )

< S, f(1) > 0. In the
case, f(~q) is depicted as shown by Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that if 1  (1 V )

< S, ~q
is uniquely determined at the point where ~q is higher than 1. In what follows, we focus
on the case where 1   (1 V )

< S. In the case, there exists an unique steady state
equilibrium with a positive rate of quality growth. See Appendix 2 for the proof.
Since the Jacobian matrix derived from the linear approximation of (19)-(21) in the
neighborhood of the steady state equilibrium is too complicated, we cannot analytically
examine the local stability of the dynamic system. However, our numerical simulations
conrm that the unique steady state is locally saddle-point stable in the benchmark setting
13
~q0
f(~q)
1 10 ~q~q ~q
f(1) f(1)
Figure 1: The steady state equilibrium: the left (right) gure represents the case where f(~q) is
inverted U-shapes (monotonically decreasing in ~q) for ~q > 1.
and the subsequent sensitivity analysis as we will see below.10
From (19) and (25), _nt = 0 and n
 > 0 implies
c =

1  2   g  (1  )
'(~q)

+
~q2   1
2h
+ 

;
where
'(~q)  
1  V

+
~q   1
h

~q + 
(~q   1)2
2h
:
Rewriting (25) yields
n =
(1  )
l(c)
'(~q)
:
The mechanism eliminating the scale eect on the steady state growth rate of outputs
is consistent with the case where there is no adjustment cost (see Peretto (2007, 2011)). In
the steady state equilibrium, modied q is independent of the scale factor of the economy,
l(c) (see (26)). An increase in production volumes allows in-house R&D expenditure to
10Since the dynamic system has one state variable (nt) and two jump variables (ct and qt), it must have
two positive characteristic roots and one negative characteristic root. Our numerical simulation reports
that the value of three characteristic root corresponding to the dynamic system are  0:4129, 0:2240, and
0:1478 in the benchmark parameter setting.
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be spread over more units of goods. Therefore, given the number of rms per capita,
more aggregate demand for intermediate goods has a direct positive eect on incentives to
in-house R&D. This eect is called as the cost-spreading eect. However, more aggregate
demand also attracts entry of a new rm as the value of a rm rises. As a result, the market
share per rms shrinks. This results in the lower scale of production of intermediate goods
at the level of an individual rm, which lowers incentives to in-house R&D. This eect is
called as the market share eect. In the steady state equilibrium, the market share eect
perfectly cancels out the cost-spreading eect (see the discussion in Peretto (2007)).11
3.3 The steady state eect of tax changes
How a permanent change of tax variables aects the steady state growth rate is also
consistent with Peretto (2007, 2011). We can summarizes as follows:
The steady state growth rate of outputs is increasing in the dividend tax rate, the corporate
tax rate (if   1), and the R&D tax credit rate. On the other hand, it is decreasing in the
corporate tax rate (if  = 0). The eect of changes in the corporate tax rate (if  2 (0; 1))
and the capital gains tax rate on the long-run growth is ambiguous.
See Appendix 4 for the proof. As previously discussed, a dividend tax cut does not
directly aect the return on in-house R&D. On the other hand, a dividend tax cut di-
rectly increases the return on equity. Given the aggregate market demand for intermediate
goods, the number of rm per capita increases. The production proliferation lowers incen-
tives to in-house R&D through the market share eect. Consequently, a dividend tax cut
unambiguously has a negative eect on the long-run growth.12
11Furthermore, we conrm that comparative statics of parameters in the steady state equilibrium get
the similar results as Peretto (2007, 2011). Increases in , , and  respectively enhance the steady state
growth rate of outputs. Increases in  allow each rm to internalize the positive return derived by its
own in-house R&D more intensely. Increases in  and  make it harder for potential entrants to go into
the market, reallocating resources from product proliferation to quality improving. On the other hand,
the eect of time discount rate, , on growth is ambiguous. Lower household's incentive to hold equities
due to an increase in the time discount rate reduces the number of rms per capita, which has positive
eect on incentives to in-house R&D, while the corresponding higher interest rate also has negative eect
on incentives to in-house R&D. Increases in h reduce the steady state growth rate of output because it
directly increases the cost of in-house R&D.
12If  = 1, the corporate tax cut also has the same qualitative eect as the dividend tax cut. When
in-house R&D expenditures are fully deductible against corporate tax, there is no dierence between the
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On the other hand, the higher rate of the R&D tax credit has an unambiguously positive
eect on the long-run growth. It works just like the direct subsidy for in-house R&D.
The growth eect of both a corporate tax cut (if  2 (0; 1)) and a capital gains tax cut
is ambiguous. These tax cut directly increase both the return on in-house R&D and the
return on equity. However, it is shown that if  = 0, a corporate tax cut unambiguously
enhances the long-run growth. And if  and  is suciently low, a capital gains tax cut
also enhances the long-run growth.
4 Numerical analysis
4.1 Data and Methodology
Since it is too complicated to analytically examine the transitional adjustment of the ag-
gregate economy to tax changes, we carry out numerical simulation by using relaxation
algorithm method developed by Trimborn, Koch, and Steger (2008).13 We calibrate the
model with U.S. data. The benchmark value of scal variables and parameters is sum-
marized in Table 1 and Table 2, which hereafter we call as the benchmark parameter
setting.
As the benchmark, we choose the value of all tax variables along the lines of Peretto
(2011).14  and  is respectively set to 0:30 and 0:04, which is conventional value in the
macroeconomic literature.  is set to 0:01, which is consistent with the average annual
population growth rate in the U.S. economy. The choice of the parameter associated
with adjustment costs, h, is less clear. According to Schubert and Turnovsky (2011), the
parameter of adjustment costs for physical capital investment is generally assumed within
dividend tax and the corporate tax.
13Trimborn, Koch, and Steger (2008) details the relaxation algorithm. They also provide MAT-
LAB programs for the relaxation algorithm, which are downloadable for free at http://www.wiwi.uni-
siegen.de/vwli/forschung/relaxation/matlab applications.html?lang=de. By using this method, Strulik
and Trimborn (2010) examines how anticipated and temporary tax reforms aect on the aggregate econ-
omy in the framework of the neoclassical (exogenous) growth model with endogenous corporate nance.
14R&D costs is in fact fully deductible against the corporate tax liability in the U.S. tax code. However,
the setting of  = 0 allows us to clearly see the fundamental distinction between the corporate tax and
the dividend tax. If R&D costs is assumed to be fully deductible ( = 1:0), a corporate tax cut has the
same qualitative eects on the economy as a dividend tax cut.
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10-15 in the literature (e.g., Ortigueira and Santos (1997) and Auerbach and Kotliko
(1987)). Nadiri (1989) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) report that the extent to
which adjustment costs for R&D investment is the same or more than that of physical
capital investment. And so we set h = 12:0 as the benchmark. The parameter associated
with entry costs, , is also less clear. Following Peretto (2011), we set  = 6:55 as the
benchmark.15  and  is respectively set to 0:141 and  = 0:266 so that the steady state
consumption ratio and the steady state growth rate of outputs respectively is 0:69 and 0:02.
 is set to 1:459 so that the fraction of time devoted to labor supply is 0:33. Table 3 reports
the value of the steady state equilibrium, fn; c; ~q; l; r; y^g, which is characterized under
the benchmark parameter setting.
Table 1: Tax variables (benchmark)
g D  V  C L
0.143 0.35 0.335 0.20 0 0.05 0.256
Table 2: Parameters (benchmark)
  h     
0.141 0.30 12.0 0.266 6.55 1.459 0.04 0.01
Table 3: Steady state equilibrium values (benchmark)
n c ~q l r y^
0.0256 0.69 1.24 0.33 0.06 0.02
In what follows, we investigate what the transitional adjustment of key macro variables
and welfare consequences are induced by the following specic tax changes: 10 percentage
point reduction of the dividend tax rate, the corporate tax rate, and the capital gains tax
rate, and 20 percentage point rise of the tax credit rate. Besides, with respect to how
each tax change comes into eect, we consider the following three dierent implementation
scenarios: (1) an unanticipated and permanent change, (2) an anticipated and permanent
change, and (3) an unanticipated and temporary change. In the every scenario, the econ-
omy initially (at t = 0) stays in the steady state equilibrium before the tax change. In the
15See Peretto (2011) for the detailed explanation for this estimation.
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implementation scenario of (1), each tax change suddenly hits at t = 5 and lasts forever
from then on. In the implementation scenario of (2), all economic agent expect at t = 0
that each tax change implements at t = 5 and last forever from then on. In the implemen-
tation scenario of (3), each tax change hits unexpectedly at t = 0 and reverts to the initial
level after t = 10. The implementation period of this reversion is expected by all economic
agents at t = 0.
Figure 2-5 show the transitional path of key macro variables in response to each tax
change with the dierent implementation scenarios as mentioned above in the benchmark
parameter setting. Specically, each panel of these gures respectively represent the tran-
sitional path of the number of rms per capita (nt), the consumption ratio (ct), modied q
(~qt), hours worked per capita (lt), the market interest rate (rt), the growth rate of outputs
per worker (y^t), the ratio of the after-tax dividends to the value of a rm, and the ratio of
the distortionary tax revenue to GDP. The horizontal axis in each panel measures years. In
the vertical axis, rt and y^t are measured by the actual value and all the other variables are
measured by the percentage deviation from the level of the initial steady state equilibrium
before the tax change.
Table 4 reports the welfare consequences of the tax changes. The welfare evaluation is
measured as consumption equivalent: how much constant relative increases in the annual
consumption per capita must be required so that the intertemporal utility of households
in the case when the economy remains in the initial steady state equilibrium before the
tax changes becomes equal to that in the case when the economy moves to the new steady
state equilibrium from the initial due to the tax changes.16
4.2 The dividend tax cut
Figure 1-(a) shows the transitional path of the key macro variables in response to the
permanent dividend tax cut by 10 percentage points comparing the unanticipated and
16More formally, the welfare evaluation is conducted as follows. UO0 (c
O; lO; y^O; nO) is dened as the
level of the intertemporal utility of households in the case when the economy remains in the initial steady
state equilibrium before a tax change. And UN0 (c
N
t ; l
N
t ; y^
N
t ; n
N
t ) is dened as that in the case when the
economy moves to the new steady state equilibrium from the initial due to a tax change. Here, we
measure consumption equivalent by  which is dened as the value to satisfy UO0 (c
O(1 + ); lO; y^O; nO) =
UN0 (c
N
t ; l
N
t ; y^
N
t ; n
N
t ). See Appendix 5 for how to calculate the value of intertemporal utility of households.
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Table 4: Welfare gains of tax changes (benchmark)
Policy change Unanticipated
(Permanent)
Anticipated
(Permanent)
Temporary
tD =  0:1  14:0  11:17  8:19
t =  0:1 5:03 5:67 0:64
tV =  0:1 13:56 10:78 7:86
 = 0:2 10:86 9:58 4:87
Note: Welfare gains are measured in consumption equivalent and expressed in percentage points.
anticipated case under the benchmark parameter setting. If the permanent tax cut is
unanticipated, the consumption ratio falls by around 10 percentage points when the tax
cut is implemented (that is, at t = 5). And then it gradually rises toward the new steady
state level. Hours worked reacts conversely. This is because the lump-sum tax increases
(or the lump-sum transfer decreases) to nance the tax cut. Actually, the ratio of the
distortionary tax revenue to GDP decreases. The number of rms per capita starts to rise
at t = 5, while modied q instantaneously falls. After the implementation of the tax cut,
they converge to the new steady state level. The growth rate of outputs per capita falls
to 0:0148 at t = 5 and then it converges to 0:0152. The unanticipated tax cut does not
directly change rm's investment decision, while it directly increases the value of a rm.
Therefore, it has a negative impact on in-house R&D through the market share eect as
previously discussed. The interest rate jumps up at t = 5 because the tax cut directly
raises the after-tax dividends. However, the interest rate gradually decreases during the
transition and it eventually falls below the initial steady state level. As Table 4 shows, this
tax change yields welfare costs of around 14 percentage points of annual consumption per
capita. The negative welfare consequence is derived from not just the lower consumption
and leisure time of households but also the slowdown of economic growth.
The impulse responses become quite dierent in the case where the permanent tax cut
is expected in advance. Households and rms take into account the future tax cut. Hence
they change their decisions when the news arrives (that is, at t = 0). At t = 0, all variables
rather than the state variable (the number of rms per capita) instantaneously change. The
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consumption ratio falls by around 2 percentage points. And it further decreases during the
announcement phase. After the tax cut is implemented (at t = 5), it gradually converges
to the new steady state level. Surprisingly, at t = 0, modied q jumps up. The growth
rate of outputs per worker rises to 0:0250. During the announcement phase, the modied
q further increases and the growth rate of outputs per worker continues to rise. After
the implementation of the tax cut, the modied q drastically drops to a lower value than
the initial steady state level and the growth rate of outputs per worker falls from 0:02
to 0:015. And then the both values converge to the new steady state level. During the
announcement phase, the number of rms per capita gradually rises through the general
equilibrium eect.
Why the implementation lag of the tax cut has a positive eect on in-house R&D
investment during the announcement phase? A lower dividend tax rate directly raises the
value of a rm given its dividend payments. The future dividend tax cut proportionately
raises the contribution of future gross cash ows to the value of a rm and the future
cost of in-house R&D. By contrast, it does not change the current cost of in-house R&D.
As a result, rms adjust the timing of dividend payments by changing their investment
schedule of in-house R&D. That is, rms increase in-house R&D investment during the
announcement phase in order to raise the subsequent dividend payments.
Although we take into account the announcement eect, the welfare eect remains in
negative. The welfare costs are estimated to be the loss of around 11:17 percentages points
of annual consumption per capita. However, the welfare costs are reduced compared to
the unanticipated case. This is because the growth rate of outputs per worker temporarily
rises during the announcement phase and the consumption and hours worked adjust more
smoothly.
Figure 2-(b) shows the transitional path in the case of the temporary tax cut. When
the tax cut is implemented (that is, at t = 0), all variables rather than the state variable
instantaneously change. After the tax cut is terminated (that is, at t = 10), all variables
reverts to the initial steady state level. Remarkably, during the implementation, modied
q declines more sharply compared to the case of the permanent tax. At t = 0, the growth
rate of outputs per worker falls to 0:0125. And then it further decreases until the tax
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cut is terminated. This is because rms have an incentive to alter the timing of dividend
payments. During the implementation, rms intend to raise their dividend payments.
Hence rms reduce their R&D investment. Consequently, the temporary dividend tax cut
also yields welfare costs. They are estimated to be around 8:2 percentage points of annual
consumption per capita.
4.3 The corporate tax cut
Figure 3-(a, b) shows impulse responses to the corporate tax cut by 10 percentage points
under the benchmark parameter setting. The transitional path of nt, ct, lt is respectively
similar to that in the case of the dividend tax cut. On the other hand, modied q adjusts
somewhat dierently. If the tax cut is unanticipated, at t = 5, the modied q jumps up and
the growth rate of outputs per workers rises to 0:0219. And then they gradually increases
to the new steady state level. If the tax cut is anticipated, at t = 0, modied q jumps
up and the growth rate of outputs per worker rises to 0:0210. And then they gradually
increases to the new steady state level. If the tax cut is temporary, the growth eect is
always positive during the transition.
Why the tax cut always has a positive eect on growth? Recall that in-house R&D
investment is not deductible against the corporate tax under the benchmark parameter
setting. The tax cut increases the contribution of the gross cash ow to the value of a rm
while it does not change the cost of in-house R&D. Hence the tax cut directly enhances
an incentive to in-house R&D. The tax cut also increases the number of rms per capita.
However, the negative eect through the product proliferation does not perfectly oset the
positive direct eect on growth. It is shown that welfare eects are positive irrespective
of how it is implemented. If in-house R&D investment is fully deductible, however, the
corporate tax has the same qualitative eects as the dividend tax.
4.4 The capital gains tax cut
Figure 4-(a) shows impulse responses due to the unanticipated (or anticipated) and perma-
nent capital gains tax cut by 10 percentage points under the benchmark case. Remarkably,
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the tax cut increases both the number of rms per capita and the growth rate of economy
in the new steady state. If the permanent tax cut is unanticipated, modied q initially
jumps up and then converges to the new steady state level. During the transition, the
growth rate of per capita is always higher than the initial level. This tax cut yields welfare
gains of around 13:56 percentage points of annual consumption per capita.
If the permanent tax cut is anticipated, however, the growth rate slows down during the
announcement phase. Future capital gains tax cuts reduces the future cost of R&D. Hence
rms have an incentive to reduce their current in-house R&D investments and raise their
current dividend payments. The temporary slowdowns of growth during the announcement
phase has a negative eect on welfare. Anticipated tax cuts make households behavior
more smoothly, yielding a positive eect on welfare. However, the positive eect cannot
oset the negative eect derived from the temporary slowdown of growth. As a result, the
anticipated tax cut reduces welfare gains by 2:77 percentage points.
Figure 4-(b) shows impulse response due to the temporary capital gains tax cut by 10
percentages points under the benchmark case. Remarkably, the growth rate of economy
accelerates during the implementation. The temporal acceleration of growth is sharply
higher than the permanent eect. The temporary tax cut reduces the cost of in-house
R&D during the implementation. Hence rms increase in-house R&D investment during
the implementation. Consequently, the temporary capital gains tax cut also yields welfare
gains. They are estimated to be around 7:86 percentage points of annual consumption per
capita.
4.5 Increases in the rate of the R&D tax credit
Figure 5-(a) shows impulse responses due to the unanticipated (or anticipated) and per-
manent rise of the R&D tax credit rate by 20 percentage points under the benchmark case.
The tax change increases the steady state growth rate of economy but reduces the steady
state number of rm per capita. Besides, in the steady state, the tax changes is shown
to be self-nancing. The ratio of distortionary tax revenues to GDP is higher than the
initial level. Hence the steady state consumption ratio is higher than the initial level. If
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the permanent tax change is unanticipated, during the transition, the growth rate and the
consumption ratio are also higher than the initial revel. As a result, it yields welfare gains
which is estimated to be around 10:86 percentage points of annual consumption per capita.
On the other hand, if the permanent tax changes is anticipated, modied q decreases
and so the growth rate falls during the announcement phase. The reason is parallel to
that in the case of the capital gains tax cut. Future rises of the R&D tax credit rate
directly reduce the future cost of in-house R&D. As a result, the implementation lag of the
tax change reduce the welfare gains by 1:28 percentage points of annual consumption per
capita.
Figure 5-(b) shows impulse response due to the temporary rise of the tax credit rate by
20 percentages points under the benchmark case. The growth eect is also parallel to that
in the case of the temporary capital gains tax cut. The temporal acceleration of growth
is sharply higher than the permanent eect. The temporary rise of the tax credit rate
reduces the cost of in-house R&D during the implementation. Firms have an incentive
to change the timing of dividend payments. Hence rms increases their in-house R&D
investment during the implementation. Consequently, the temporary capital gains tax cut
also yields welfare gains. They are estimated to be around 4:87 percentage points of annual
consumption per capita.
5 Sensitivity analysis
5.1 Parameter changes
We conduct the robustness check by changing some parameters. Firstly, we consider in-
creasing or decreasing the value of less clear parameter, h and . Secondly, we also consider
the case of  = 1:0 as the real tax code in the U.S. sets to  = 1:0. In any case, we reesti-
mate  and  so that the consumption ratio and growth rate of output in the steady state
before tax changes keep the same level under the benchmark setting. Only results of the
corporate tax cut in  = 1:0 qualitatively changes. This is because a corporate tax cut has
the same eects as a divided tax cut if in-house R&D investment is fully deductible. For
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the other cases, our main ndings in the benchmark analysis qualitatively hold. Besides,
we also consider the case in which labor supply is inelastic (that is,  = 0). In this case,
our main ndings in the benchmark analysis qualitatively hold. Table 5 reports the welfare
consequences of tax changes in those alternative parameter setting.
5.2 Social returns to product variety
In the model as described thus far, the number of rms (product variety) per capita does
not directly contribute to the production of nal goods. It only aects degree of the market
competition among intermediate goods rms. This indirect channel distorts incentives to
in-house R&D. In what follows, we relax this somewhat extreme feature. Along the lines
of Peretto (2007, 2011), we consider the case where there exists social positive returns to
product variety of intermediate goods in the production of nal goods as follows:
Yt = n
v
t
Z Nt
0
Xit
 
Zit
Z1 t Lit
1 
di; v > 0;
where the contribution to product variety on output of nal goods is assumed to be external
to all agents. In this case, the reduce-form production function of nal goods is rewritten
by
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
t
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The dynamic system of the economy is modied as follows:
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The growth rate of output per worker is given by ~qt 1
h
+  _nt
nt
. In the steady state, the
number of rms per capita is constant. The steady state growth rate of output is only
dependent of modied q as is the case  = 0. If  > 0, the steady state number of rms
per capita is given by (n)
1
1  , where n is the value of the steady state number of rms
per capita in the case  = 0. Other steady state values coincide with those in the case
 = 0. Therefore, permanent taxation eects on variables in the steady state equilibrium
are consistent with the case  = 0.
The transitional responses of macro variables rather than the growth rate of output
per worker are qualitatively consistent with the case  = 0. The growth rate of output
per worker is also dependent of the growth rate of the number of rms per capita during
the transition. If the intensity of the growth rate of product variety dominates that of the
growth rate of quality, the transitional path of the growth rate of output per worker is
modied compared to the case  = 0. As an example, Figure 6 (a, b) shows that impulse
responses to the dividend tax cut by 10 percentages points in the case  = 0:3. In this
case, even if the tax cut is unanticipated and permanent (or temporary), the growth rate
of output per worker initially jumps up. However, the other variables moves in the similar
way as the case  = 0. That is, in this case, the positive growth rate of product variety
initially osets the growth rate of quality, resulting in the initial jump of the growth rate
of output per worker. Our main ndings about investment decision of in-house R&D of
rms holds qualitatively.
However, in the case  > 0, welfare of households is also dependent of the number of
rms per capita. Higher product variety directly increases welfare of households. So we
need to check the robustness about welfare consequences for tax changes. Table 6 reports
the welfare consequences of tax changes in the case  = 0:1; 0:3; 0:5, and 0:7. The table
shows that as the value of the spillover parameter increases the welfare losses from the
dividend tax cut diminish. The welfare gains from the corporate tax cut and the capital
gains tax cut rise. And the welfare gains from rise of the R&D tax credit rate diminish.
However, the sign of those welfare eects does not change. And, in any tax change, the
welfare eect of the implementation lag qualitatively holds.
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6 Policy implications and Conclusion remarks
In what follows, we summarize our results. The dividend tax cut is not an eective policy
instrument irrespective of how it is implemented. The intuition of the negative eect of
the tax cut on the long-run growth is same as Peretto (2007, 2011). The tax cut yields
product proliferation and reduce incentives to in-house R&D of rms through the market
share eect. However, the welfare losses of the tax cut diminishes by the implementation
lags of the tax cut. The implementation lags allow rms to adjust the timing of their
dividend payments to the tax schedule by changing their investment decisions of in-house
R&D. The future dividend tax cut increases both the contribution of future gross cash ow
to the value of rms and the future cost of in-house R&D. Hence rms increases current
in-house R&D investment during the announcement phase in order to raise the subsequent
dividend payments. Besides, the announcement also allows households to adjust the timing
of consumption and leisure time more smoothly. If the tax cut is temporary, during the
implementation, rms reduce the current investment in order to raise the current dividend
payments. As a result, the temporary tax cut also yields a negative eect on growth and
welfare.
On the other hand, the capital gains tax cut and rises of the R&D tax credit rate are
eective policy instrument. The intuition of the long-run eect is also same as Peretto
(2007, 2011).17 However, the eectiveness of these policy is worsened by the implementa-
tion lags. The announcement of the future tax changes reduces the future cost of in-house
R&D. Hence rms increases the current dividend payments and reduce the current R&D
investment in order to increases the future R&D investment. If these tax changes are
temporary, during the transition, the current cost of in-house R&D are reduced. Hence,
rms increases the current in-house R&D investment. As a result, the temporary these
tax changes yields positive eect on growth and welfare.18
Therefore, when considering how to design the corporate taxation policy, the policy
17Theoretically, the long-run eect of the capital gains tax cut is ambiguous. However, in our calibration,
the long-run eect is positive.
18The corporate tax cut seems to be also eective policy instruments. However, if in-house R&D
investment is fully deductible against the corporate tax liability, the qualitative eect of the corporate tax
coincides with the dividend tax cut.
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makers are careful about the dynamic responses of forward looking investment decisions
of rms which consider the timing of dividend payments.
A Appendix
A.1 Appendix 1
The perfect distribution in the nal goods sector yields (letting Lit = Lt):
2Yt = NtXt; (A-1)
(1  )Yt = WtNtLt: (A-2)
Using the denition of ct, (A-2), and the market equilibrium condition of labor, NtLt =
etlt, (15) can be rewritten to (17). Substituting (2) and the market equilibrium condition
of labor into (1) yields (18).
A.2 Appendix 2
Dividing both sides of (16) by Yt and using the denition of nt and ct, (A-1), (18), and
(12), we obtain
1  2   g   ct = nt

l(ct)

+
(Rt; Zt)
Zt
+ 

_nt
nt
+ 

: (A-3)
Dividing (5) by Zt and using (11), we obtain
(Rt; Zt)
Zt
=
(Sqt)
2   1
2h
: (A-4)
Substituting (A-4) into (A-3) and using (17), we obtain (19).
From (A-1), the denition of nt, and (18), we obtain
Ft
Zt
=

1  


Xt
Zt
  ;
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(a) Anticipated vs: unanticipated permanent reduction of the dividend tax rate by 10
percentage points in the benchmark setting. Solid (Dashed) lines plots the impulse response of
each variable to the anticipated (unanticipated) tax cut. The circle marks on the left (right) vertical
axis indicates the steady state level before (after) the tax cut.
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(b) Temporary reduction of the dividend tax cut by 10 percentage points in the benchmark
setting. The circle mark on the vertical axis indicates the initial level.
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(a) Anticipated vs: unanticipated permanent reduction of the corporate tax rate by 10
percentage points in the benchmark setting. Solid (Dashed) lines plots the impulse response of
each variable to the anticipated (unanticipated) tax cut. The circle marks on the left (right) vertical
axis indicates the steady state level before (after) the tax cut.
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(b)Temporary reduction of the corporate tax cut by 10 percentage points in the benchmark
setting. The circle mark on the vertical axis indicates the initial level.
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(a) Anticipated vs: unanticipated permanent reduction of the capital gains tax rate by 10
percentage points in the benchmark setting. Solid (Dashed) lines plots the impulse response of
each variable to the anticipated (unanticipated) tax cut. The circle marks on the left (right) vertical
axis indicates the steady state level before (after) the tax cut.
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(b) Temporary reduction of the capital gains tax cut by 10 percentage points in the bench-
mark setting. The circle mark on the vertical axis indicates the initial level.
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(a) Anticipated vs: unanticipated permanent rise of the tax credit rate by 20 percentage
points in the benchmark setting. Solid (Dashed) lines plots the impulse response of each variable
to the anticipated (unanticipated) change. The circle marks on the left (right) vertical axis indicates
the steady state level before (after) rise of the tax credit.
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(b) Temporary rise of the tax credit rate by 20 percentage points in the benchmark setting.
The circle mark on the vertical axis indicates the initial level.
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(a) Anticipated vs: unanticipated permanent reduction of the dividend tax rate by 10
percentage points in the case of  = 0:3. Solid (Dashed) lines plots the impulse response of each
variable to the anticipated (unanticipated) tax cut. The circle marks on the left (right) vertical axis
indicates the steady state level before (after) the tax cut.
0 10 20
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
n
0 10 20
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
c
0 10 20
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
modified q
0 10 20
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
hours worked
0 10 20
0.052
0.054
0.056
0.058
0.06
0.062
0.064
interest rate
0 10 20
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.02
0.022
growth rate of y
0 10 20
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
dividend ratio
0 10 20
0.955
0.96
0.965
0.97
0.975
0.98
0.985
0.99
0.995
1
tax revenue ratio
(b) Temporary reduction of the dividend tax cut by 10 percentage points in the case of
 = 0:3. The circle mark on the vertical axis indicates the initial level.
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= (1  )
l(ct)
nt
  : (A-5)
Using (A-4), (A-5), and (11), (13) is rewritten by
rt =
(1  D)(1  )


(1  )
l(ct)
nt
  

  (1  D)(1  )

"
(Sqt)
2   1
2h
#
+ (1  V )Sqt   1
h
:
Then, from the denition of S and , rearranging the above equation yields (interest rate)
From logarithmic dierentiation of ct with respect to time yields
_ct
ct
=
_Ct
Ct
 
_Yt
Yt
= rt   +  
(
_l(ct)
l(ct)
+ +
_Zt
Zt
)
:
Using (17) and (11), the above equation is rewritten by
_ct
ct
= rt   +  _ct
1 +  ct
  Sqt   1
h
: (A-6)
Rearranging (A-6) yields (20).
From (2), (8), and the market equilibrium condition of labor, given Zt and Lt, we obtain
@Ft
@Zt
= (1  )
l(ct)
nt
: (A-7)
Using the denition of S and , (11), and (A-7), (10) is rewritten by
(1  )
S

l(ct)
nt
+
(Sqt   1)2
2Sh
=
1
1  V rtqt   _qt:
Then, using (17), it yields (21).
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A.3 Appendix 3
The dynamical system of the economy where qt  1 is constituted by
_nt =

1  2   g   ct
 
l(ct)

  [+ ] nt

;
_ct = ct [1 +  ct] [rt   ] ;
_qt =
1
1  V rtqt  
(1  )
S

l(ct)
nt
;
where the interest rate is given by
rt =
(1  V )
S

(1  )
l(ct)
nt
  

:
A.4 Appendix 4
Dierentiating (26) with respect to ~q yields
f 0(~q) 
8>>>>><>>>>>:
241 +   2
1  V
35 ~q
h
+
24 1
1  V   1
35 S + 1
h
 

1  V ; if ~q > 1;
 

1  V ; if ~q  1:
And second order dierentiating (26) with respect to ~q yields
f 00(~q) 
8>>>><>>>>:
241 +   2
1  V
35 1
h
< 0; if ~q > 1;
0; if ~q  1:
Here,
lim
~q!1+0
f 0(~q) =
1
h(1  V ) [V (S   1)  (1  )  h] :
If S  1   (1 V )

(< 1), f(1) < 0 and lim~q!1+0 f 0(~q) < 0. Then, f 0(~q) < 0 for
~q > 1 as f 00(~q) < 0 for ~q > 1. Therefore, in this case, f(~q) has only one solution of ~q which
value is less than one. That is, there is no steady state equilibrium with positive growth
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rate of output. On the other hand, if 1   (1 V )

< S, f(1) > 0. No matter whether
lim~q!1+0 f 0(~q) < 0 is positive or negative, f(~q) has unique solution of ~q which value is
higher than one as depicted in Figure 1.
A.5 Appendix 5
Dierentiating the LHS of (26) with respect to D, , tV , and  respectively yields
@f(~q)
@D
=


1  V +

1
1  V   1


~q   1
h

1
(1  D)S > 0;
@f(~q)
@
=


1  V +

1
1  V   1


~q   1
h


(1  )S +

2

(1  ) > 0;
@f(~q)
@
=


1  V +

1
1  V   1


~q   1
h


(1  )S  
(1  )
(1  )2 T 0:;
=   < 0; if  = 0;
=


1  V +

1
1  V   1


~q   1
h

1
(1  )S > 0; if  = 1;
@f(~q)
@V
=   
(1  V )2 ~q
 +
~q   1
h(1  V )

S   ~q

1  V

  (~q) T 0:
 (1) =   
(1  V )2 < 0;
 0(~q) =
1
(1  V )2h [ 2~q
   h+ 1 + S(1  V )] T 0;
 0(~q) =   2
(1  V )2h < 0:
Because f(~q) is decreasing function of ~q in the neighborhood around the steady state
solution, this derivation implies that the steady state growth rate is increasing function
of D,  (if  = 1) and is decreasing ,  (if  = 0) and the eect of tax change of 
(if  2 (0; 1)) and V is ambiguous. However, if S < (1 + h)=(1   V ),  (~q) < 0 for
~q  1. Then, it is shown that if S < (1 + h)=(1  V ), the steady state growth rate is
decreasing function of V .
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A.6 Appendix 6
We dene 	t  Ut  1  logZt. From the denition of ct, (11), and (18), dierentiating 	t
with respect to time yields
_	t = (  )	t   log 
  log ct   log lt    log (1  lt)  1
  
Sqt   1
h
:
In the steady state, 	t is constant over time. Calculating the dynamic path of 	t nu-
merically by using the relaxation algorithm, we can obtain the initial value of 	t, that
is 	0 = U0   1  logZ0. Without loss of generality, Z0 is normalized to one. Hence, we
obtain U0 = 	0.
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Table 5: Welfare gains of tax changes (parameter changes)
Tax change Unanticipated
(Permanent)
Anticipated
(Permanent)
Temporary
 = 3:275 (with  = 0:277 and  = 0:125)
tD =  0:1  14:94  12:21  8:52
t =  0:1 5:09 5:76 0:58
tV =  0:1 15:33 12:63 8:3
 = 0:2 11:55 10:3 5:05
 = 9:825 (with  = 0:0945 and  = 0:408)
tD =  0:1  13:7  10:85  8:08
t =  0:1 5:03 5:65 0:66
tV =  0:1 13:04 10:25 7:72
 = 0:2 10:66 9:36 4:81
h = 8:0 (with  = 0:133 and  = 0:267)
tD =  0:1  15:44  11:41  9:98
t =  0:1 5:87 6:55 0:89
tV =  0:1 15:1 11:05 9:7
 = 0:2 12:37 10:37 6:05
h = 18:0 (with  = 0:153 and  = 0:265)
tD =  0:1  12:5  10:55  6:64
t =  0:1 4:2 4:77 0:44
tV =  0:1 12:02 10:15 6:29
 = 0:2 9:39 8:59 3:88
 = 1:0 (with  = 0:0955 and  = 0:260)
tD =  0:1  13:86  11:05  8:08
t =  0:1  13:6  10:83  7:95
tV =  0:1 12:95 10:15 7:69
 = 0:2 17:06 15:0 7:55
 = 0
tD =  0:1  14:23  9:93  7:12
t =  0:1 4:81 4:64 0:53
tV =  0:1 13:5 9:16 6:72
 = 0:2 10:87 8:20 4:18
Note: Welfare gains are measured in consumption equivalent and expressed in percentage points.
Other values of the tax variables and parameters are sames as the benchmark setting.
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Table 6: Welfare gains of tax changes (positive social spillover of product variety)
Tax change Unanticipated
(Permanent)
Anticipated
(Permanent)
Temporary
 = 0:1
tD =  0:1  13:08  10:17  7:95
t =  0:1 5:88 6:59 0:83
tV =  0:1 13:73 10:98 7:86
 = 0:2 10:72 9:43 4:82
 = 0:3
tD =  0:1  10:75  7:78  7:12
t =  0:1 8:07 8:88 1:42
tV =  0:1 14:17 11:53 7:85
 = 0:2 10:35 9:1 4:66
 = 0:5
tD =  0:1  7:57  4:65  5:86
t =  0:1 11:08 11:93 2:35
tV =  0:1 14:76 12:25 7:85
 = 0:2 9:87 8:68 4:43
 = 0:7
tD =  0:1  3:07  0:22  4:11
t =  0:1 15:34 16:22 3:61
tV =  0:1 15:54 13:24 7:86
 = 0:2 9:23 8:13 4:13
Note: Welfare gains are measured in consumption equivalent and expressed in percentage points.
Other values of tax variables and parameters are same as the benchmark setting.
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